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prospects for after-the-war development are exceedingly bright and that she can look forward to an era of prosperity. Her students are rapidly finishing their studies at your colleges and are returning to their home-land to take up the work there awaiting them—and there will be plenty for them to do. With trade properly developed, and her manufactures increased, China will then be ready to take her place among the nations of the world as a dominant factor.

In conclusion, let me invite you one and all to visit our country and see for yourselves what we have there. We will welcome you and endeavor to make you feel at home. Let industrial and mercantile commissions be sent from this country to report to the merchants, manufacturers and capitalists here what a grand opportunity awaits America for trade with China. We want your help in China; yes, but remember that in return we can give you large financial reward for such assistance. I sincerely hope that in your own after-the-war plans you will see the opportunities awaiting you in China and plan accordingly. Success and prosperity for China after the war would then be doubly assured.

THE FUTURE OF RUSSIA

By JEROME B. LANDFIELD

RUSSIAN ECONOMIC LEAGUE

THE future of Russia is a large topic. I shall be pardoned, I am sure, if I make the excuse that the time at my disposal is inadequate for a satisfactory treatment of it. But I will be frank and say that had I any amount of time I should not be willing to indulge in prophecy with any degree of confidence.

Nevertheless, it is possible to examine the materials at our disposal and trace some general lines of development in Russia that point to the probable course of events. To get a correct basis for our observations it is necessary to put aside certain prejudices and to throw into the discard a mass of misconceptions.

The prejudices are largely the result of ideas concerning Russia that were fostered in this country before the war through giving entirely too much credence to fugitive Russian revolutionists and to sensational journalists, and of our failure to realize the great part in the war played by Russia. It has been too easy for the average man to regard Russia as a traitor that went back on her allies, and forget that for two long years

Russia bore the brunt of the war and saved Europe at a cost of more than nine million casualties, and that she succumbed from utter economic exhaustion and German intrigue.

The Revolution was hailed in America as the dawn of a new day. As a matter of fact it was a violent disorganization of national life at a time when there were no constructive forces ready for the task of rebuilding the structure. The developments that took place were not unexpected to those who knew Russia.

In reality the revolution did not go very deep. The importance of its successive steps and currents has been greatly exaggerated by observers whose perspective has suffered from being too close to the stirring events in the large cities and from lack of experience in Russia in peaceful days. To the world at large Russia has appeared to be one vast chaos, aimless and hopeless.

To understand Russia you must visualize the people as being divided into two general classes: the minority dwelling in the cities and along the railroads; and the vast majority of agricultural peasants living away from these lines of communication, and therefore inarticulate. The former class includes both the "intelligentsia" and the industrial population. These are the people affected by the revolution, who participated in party struggles, who were demoralized by socialistic theory. These are the people whose voices we hear, whose ideas we interpret as the opinion of Russia.

The vast mass of the people, eighty per cent. or more, are silent. They do not know what the revolution is all about. They were disturbed, to be sure, by the land question and indulged in agrarian disorders, without however improving their situation or being brought into relationship with any of the political currents of the cities.

The character of a people, its ideals, its religion, its habits of thought, are not changed in a day or a year. Here we have a hundred and fifty million people, homogeneous, speaking the same language, having the same culture, professing the same religion. They have the conservatism of an agricultural population. Is it conceivable that they have suddenly undergone a complete transformation because little groups in the cities have been talking loudly about their various political programs?

This gives us a starting point for considering the probable course that events will take in Russia to-day. The people in the cities are starving; the peasants in their villages have food. Thanks to Kerensky and Lenin, industry is dead. The goods

which the peasants need are not forthcoming. Economic life is at a standstill. The money which is being printed off at the rate of four bililons a month is valueless. The peasant hides his food and stands in fear of Red Guard requisitions. What is the result?

The peasant psychology is simple. He sees only two things: the old régime and the present anarchy. Under the old régime life was possible, he remembers its joys and forgets its hardships. In the present anarchy, life is unendurable. Such words as "democracy," "republic," "soviet" mean for him only tyranny and utter disorder. His whole tendency to-day, therefore, is toward reaction. It is most significant that for months the peasants in various parts of Russia have been sending delegations to the towns to seek out the landowners and beg them to return and take back the estates from which they had been forced to flee.

Now look at this tendency in its larger significance; in its bearing on the international situation. Russia is coming back—of this there can be no question. Nothing can prevent her people from again attaining a strong national existence. Leaders will be found, armies will be formed that will clean the canker out of Moscow and satisfy Russian national aspirations. Who the men will be, we do not know. But men will be found. It may take months or it may take years. Suppose then that the Allies and America continue their policy of inaction, merely standing by and waiting for Russia to work out her own destiny without assistance.

Almost inevitably there will result a military dictatorship, and then a powerful, reactionary autocracy. That autocracy will not only guide the destinies of all these millions of people, but it will dispose of an enormous area of undeveloped natural resources, comparable to the American continent of a century ago; wheat, cotton, iron, copper, gold, oil, coal and forests. The Russians will hate the Allies and America, for they will recall the sacrifices they made for the common cause and that, when they were in trouble, they called for help in vain. They will snap their fingers at any arrangements made for them at the Peace Conference, arrangements in which they had no hand, and neither Europe nor America will undertake a fresh war to coerce them.

Worse than this; it will be German brains that are employed in the tasks of reorganization. Your German engineer and business man will not wish to remain in Germany, where there will be a lack of opportunity and heavy taxation. He will find

other lands closed to him. But the autocratic power in Russia, needing such ability in its work of reconstruction and in the development of resources, will turn to the German and open the wonderful field to him. Can you not picture the result?

Such is a view of the future of Russia if present tendencies are allowed to develop unguided, undirected. The situation is bad, but not hopeless. Quick, sagacious action may save it. The Russian situation is the key to the whole international situation, and upon its solution depends the durability of the peace to be made at Paris. Therefore it demands inter-Allied unity of plan no less than did the conduct of the war on the western front. The Allies must work through Russians; not through Russian politicians, but through the patriotic men who have been gathering together the forces of loyal soldiers to fight for the recovery of their land from the hands of the looters and plunderers. Quick support in money, arms, munitions and economic aid to these leaders will not only enable them to restore order and save Russia, but will also earn Russian gratitude and give us some voice and guidance in the formation of the government that is to come, and avoid the grave danger that would otherwise threaten the peace of Europe. This is no time for petty questions of non-interference or theoretical democracy; it is a matter of self-preservation for Europe and for ourselves. It is up to us to say whether we shall grasp the opportunity and do our duty, or whether we shall by inaction and academic haggling, take upon ourselves the full responsibility for another catastrophe.

GERMANY AFTER THE WAR¹

By Dr. DAVID JAYNE HILL

LATELY AMBASSADOR TO GERMANY

IN accepting an invitation to speak of "Germany after the War," I feel constrained to say, that I should consider it adventurous for me, not being inspired with the gift of prophesy, to predict the condition of Germany when the war is really over; which, of course, will not be until a treaty of peace is signed.

The state of mind and the political situation in Germany when the conditions of peace have been imposed and must be executed, will perhaps be entirely different from what they are to-day. At present, Germany, virtually reduced to military impotence, is seeking to procure for herself the most favorable